One of the basic tenets of usability is to answer user questions clearly and concisely. One concrete technique is to use placeholder strings liberally in messages (typically coded in C-like languages as "%s" for strings or "%d" for numbers).
This notion pops into my head whenever I'm doing anything significant in SQL*Plus. Here's a condensed excerpt from a typical log file of mine. The questions that run through my mind aren't that deep -- what table is being updated? What index, package, procedure, etc. is being created? It seems redundant for me to have to put that information into PROMPT commands.
34094 rows updated.
Package body created.
I never pushed too hard though to get a change like this into SQL*Plus, because just imagine how many test cases and automated builds expect to see some exact sequence of output that would suddenly be different. I expect it would require some sort of SET option within SQL*Plus, which in turn would involve new documentation, a long adoption cycle, scripts that used the new SET option would throw errors for older versions of SQL*Plus... all of a sudden it's not so clean.
Another possibility for this usability technique is the set of database error messages. How many messages say that some limit has been exceeded, or there's a problem with some object, where the erroneous thing that was encountered, or the correct thing that was expected, is never specified?
Again, test cases are difficult to change. Extensive error messages are also tricky for translation, because maybe the placeholder needs to be moved around because of different sentence structures in different languages. Maybe the value of the placeholder causes a ripple effect elsewhere in the message, as with the "le / la" distinction in French depending on whether a noun is considered masculine or feminine.
The lesson here is that these little touches are important to bake in from the beginning.
Security is another consideration that wasn't so obvious when the usability bibles were being written. If someone can induce an application to print a < character where one isn't expected, and the output is written to a web page, presto an attacker can construct a string to be echoed in an error message with a <script>, <iframe>, or other tag that can change the contents of the page as part of a cross-site scripting attack. So there's an extra level of scrutiny for every message string, to ensure that it doesn't have disallowed characters, that the substitution text isn't too long, and so on.